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REAL PROPERTY
By JOHN T.

BONDURANT*

AND DAVID E.

ARVIN**

The Kentucky Law Survey has not specifically considered
developments in property law for the last thirteen years.1
Consequently, the authors have expanded the customary one
year survey period to include appellate decisions rendered
from January 1, 1976 through June 30, 1980.2 Because of the
large number of important decisions in that period, this article cannot consider many important property topics such as
bailments, 3 mineral estates, 4 joint bank accounts,5 real estate
brokers,8 escrows 7 and lis pendens filings.8 Rather, the focus
* Member of the firm of Brown, Todd & Heyburn, Sixteenth Floor, Citizens
Plaza, Louisville, Kentucky 40202; J.D. 1960, University of Kentucky.
** Sole practitioner, P.O. Box 1051, Hopkinsville, Kentucky 42240; J.D. 1980,
University of Kentucky.
I See Court of Appeals Review - Property, 56 Ky. L.J. 435 (1968).
2 The beginning of this time period was selected to coincide with the inception of
Kentucky's intermediate appellate court, the court of appeals. See Ch. 84, § 3, 1974
Ky. Acts 168.
' See Central Parking System v. Miller, 586 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. 1979) (liability of
parking garage operators); Vinson v. Gobrecht, 560 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977)
(bailor's contributory negligence).
See Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1976) (broad form
deeds); Bigge v. Tallent, 539 S.W.2d 288 (Ky. 1976) (oil and gas lease not forfeited by
non-production); L.E. Cooke Corp. v. Hayes, 549 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977),
appeal dismissed per compromise and settlement, 572 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1978) (payment of annual $1.00 royalty sufficient to sustain mineral lease terminable at option
of lessee).
5 See Bealert v. Mitchell, 585 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionary review
denied, 585 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1979) (joint owner of savings and loan association account has power to delete the name of the other joint owner); Anderson v. Anderson,
583 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (surviving spouse may bring back into deceased
spouse's estate money individually owned by deceased spouse and passing to deceased spouse's children via joint bank account); Barton v. Hudson, 560 S.W.2d 20
(Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (allowing attachment of the entire corpus of a joint bank account
by judgment creditor).
6 See Leishman v. Goodlett, 608 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionaryreview
denied, 609 S.W.2d 368 (Ky. 1980) (no recovery from the real estate education, research and recovery fund for dishonest acts of a real estate licensee which are not
subject to Kentucky Real Estate Commission regulation); Helm v. Warner, 597
S.W.2d 159 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (intentional acts of wrongdoing required to subject a
licensee to discipline before the Kentucky Real Estate Commission); Neel v. WagnerShuck Realty Co., 576 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (broker's procurement of unconditional binding contract between buyer and seller entitles broker to commission,
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will be on developments of interest to the real estate practitioner including discussions of contracts for the sale of real
property, private law devices for land use control, common
law dedication and easements appurtenant.
I.

A.

CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

Right of First Refusal

Wilson v. Grey9 presented for the first time in Kentucky
the question of whether a lease clause giving the lessee a right
of first refusal on any sale of property could apply to the sale
of one co-owner's interest to another co-owner.10 The property
was originally devised to the lessees by the sole owner for a
period of ten years. The lease contained a right of first refusal
clause which read in pertinent part: "Should lessor ever desire
to sell the leased premises lessees are given the right to
purchase the same at the price which lessor has been offered
for the premises."1 1
Two years after the lease was entered into the lessor died,
devising the leased premises as follows: an undivided one-half
interest to one son and an undivided one-fourth interest each
to another son and a former daughter-in-law. The second son
then sold his one-fourth interest to the first son in a bona fide
regardless of whether the buyer is "ready, willing and able" to complete the deal);
Miller v. Gohmann, 565 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionaryreview denied, 585
S.W.2d 394 (Ky. 1978) (broker with knowledge of defect in seller's title not entitled to
receive commission).
7 See Fisk v. Peoples Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 570 S.W.2d 657 (Ky. Ct. App.),
discretionary review denied, 585 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1978) (attorney may act as escrow
agent for both parties if there is no conflict in his representations).
1 See Leonard v. Farmers & Traders Bank, 605 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionary review denied, 609 S.W.2d 365 (Ky. 1980) (lis pendens is for notice only,
and does not create k lien on subject property with priority over subsequent purchasers); Bonnie Braes Farms, Inc. v. Robinson, 598 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (filing of lis pendens cannot be abuse of process, but may give rise to slander of title
action).
9 560 S.W.2d 561 (Ky. 1978), rev'g Grey v. Wilson, 554 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977).
10 All the parties agreed that the case presented a question of first impression,
but the court of appeals disagreed, characterizing the dispute as one that "can be
resolved by the application of well accepted rules of construction of contracts." 554
S.W.2d at 869.
11 560 S.W.2d at 561.
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arm's length transaction, whereupon the lessees brought an
action for specific performance of the right of first refusal provision in the lease agreement. 12 In a brief opinion without
cited authority, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that
where the sale is between or among existing co-owners there
has been no conveyance that would trigger any preemption
13
rights of lessees.
The Wilson holding is consistent with a majority of similar cases in other states. 14 Logically, such a holding would appear proper in that the parties to a lease would not normally
consider a sale between co-lessors as activating a right of first
refusal. If Wilson is read narrowly, however, the result
reached would follow only when there is but one original lessor and not in other co-lessor situations. The Court observed
that
[w]hen the lease was executed there was but one "lessor."
Obviously a "sale" could have been made only to a person or
persons other than that lessor. When she died [her children]
became the collective "lessor," and the sale of [one's share
Id. at 561-62.
Id. at 562.
,4 See, e.g., Kroehnke v. Zimmerman, 467 P.2d 265 (Colo. 1970) (a conveyance of
leased premises from lessors to their wholly owned corporation held not a sale within
the meaning of first refusal provision); Isaacson v. First Sec. Bank, 511 P.2d 269
(Idaho 1973) (conveyance of leased farm to lessor's son for approximately one third
actual value held not a sale for purpose of first refusal clause); Heidlebaugh v. Korn,
498 P.2d 1195 (Mont. 1972) (provision in lessor's will giving son right to purchase
leased premises from other devisees at the appraised value fixed in the estate held
not a sale for purpose of first refusal provision); Rogers v. Neiman, 193 N.W.2d 266
(Neb. 1971) (sale by each of two co-lessors of their undivided one-fifth interest to
another co-lessor held not a sale for the purpose of the lessee's first refusal option);
Sand v. London & Co., 121 A.2d 559 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (sale of leased
premises from one company to another company owned and controlled by the same
interests not a sale in violation of first refusal clause); Torrey Delivery, Inc. v. Chautauqua Truck Sales & Serv, Inc., 366 N.Y.S.2d 506 (App. Div. 1975) (conveyance
from merged corporation to surviving corporation not a sale within meaning of lease
clause). But see Meyer v. Warner, 448 P.2d 394 (Ariz. 1968) (sale of one-half undivided interest from one co-lessor to the other co-lessor held to be a sale for purposes
of first refusal clause).
In determining what constitutes a "sale" within the meaning of a first refusal
clause, the courts have looked either to the presence or absence of an arm's length
transfer between the lessor and the transferee, or to the effect of the conveyance as to
removing from the subject property the lessee's right of first refusal. Annot., 70
A.L.R. 3d 203, 206-07 (1976).
12
13
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to another] was not a sale to a person other than the
lessor.15
The above statement by the Court suggests that if plural
lessors grant a right of first refusal, a subsequent sale among
co-lessors would effect a sale within the meaning of the lease
agreement. The lessee could then exercise his preemptive
right. This would permit a lessee to exercise a right of first
refusal in a sale between multiple original lessors, yet deny a
lessee this right in a sale between heirs, devisees or donees of
a singular lessor. Some uncertainty remains, however, and a
court presented with sympathetic facts might extend Wilson
to a case where multiple original lessors are involved. In any
event, attorneys should be alert to Wilson and follow its application, especially when drafting documents for co-owners
which grant a right of first refusal.
Jones v. White Sulphur Springs Farm, Inc.1 6 addressed
the extent to which a lessee, pursuant to a right of first refusal, may deviate from the terms of a third party's offer to
the lessor. 17 Jones received an acceptable offer from Marston1 8
and, in accordance with the lease agreement,1 9 conveyed this
offer to the lessee White Sulphur. White Sulphur announced
that it wished to exercise its option and began negotiations
with Jones which resulted in a memorandum of agreement
containing terms different from those in the Marston offer.20
560 S.W.2d at 562.
18

605 S.W.2d 38 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionary review denied, 609 S.W.2d 364

(Ky. 1980).
17 This case also dealt with rescission based on unilateral mistake, discussed in
the text accompanying notes 78-89 infra.
18 The entire agreement was made subject to preemption by White Sulphur's

right of first refusal. 605 S.W.2d at 40.
" The lease agreement between Jones and White Sulphur contained a first re-

fusal clause which read as follows:
In the event first party shall desire to sell said farm other than by public
auction during the term of this lease or any renewals thereof, he shall require a written offer from a prospective purchaser and second party shall
have the right of the first refusal to purchase said farm at the price set
forth in said written offer. Second party shall have thirty (30) days after
actual receipt of notice and a copy of such written offer to notify first party
of his exercise of this option.
'o Id. at 40-41.
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Both agreements, however, provided for a payment of
$100,000 to be made to Jones within ninety days after the
date of the Marston offer. At the end of the ninety day period
Marston tendered the $100,000, Jones refused to accept it and
Marston instituted suit.2 1
On appeal it was argued that a party attempting to
purchase property subject to a first refusal 'option held by
someone else has no standing to object to the improper execution of the option.22 The court rejected this argument and
ruled unqualifiedly that a prospective purchaser does have the
right to insist on strict compliance by the lessee with the
terms of the first refusal provision.23
The court then turned to the question of whether the first
refusal provision had been properly exercised. It recognized
that only minor variations from the third person's offer which
have no effect on the substance of the agreement are permissible24 and that for an optionee to exercise his option he must
give as much as or more than the option requires. 2 5 Although
the court was equivocal on whether certain terms negotiated
between Jones and White Sulphur constituted an improper
exercise of the right of first refusal,26 it is clear that even miId.
22 Id. at 41.
21
23

Id.

24 Id. (quoting Brownies Creek Collieries, Inc. v. Asher Coal Mining Co., 417
S.W.2d 249 (Ky. 1967)).
25 605 S.W.2d at 41 (citing Cozart v. Turley, 411 S.W.2d 481, 485 (Ky. 1967)).
Standing alone, this rule has no place in the law governing exercise of rights of first
refusal, for it serves to protect primarily the seller and to a lesser extent the holder of
the right. Rights of first refusal in a lease, however, involve three parties who need
protection under the law. The third party offeror reasonably expects to be regarded
as something more than a bidding agent of the seller attempting to extract a better
price from the preemptor. Therefore, the "as much as or more than the option requires" rule must be read in conjunction with the "minor variations" rule.
White Sulphur Springs deals with these two rules awkwardly, but the result of
the case leaves it clear that only minor variations between offer and acceptance are
permissible and any variations must result in a better deal for the seller. "The variations. . . made White Sulphur's offer less than Marston's [and] leads to the conclusion that White Sulphur never effectively exercised the option." 605 S.W.2d at 41
(emphasis added).
26 The better holding on this issue would have been that the first refusal right
was not properly exercised. In a letter between attorneys for the parties it was said:
"[I]f your clients decide not to execute said contract, we are hereby accepting the
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nor variations from the original offer will receive very strict
scrutiny by the court. Doubts as to the materiality of terms
will probably be. resolved in favor of the third party offeror.
Finally, the court concluded "that if White Sulphur may
have at one time had any superior right [to Marston], it was
ended by failure of White Sulphur to timely tender payment
.... '2 Although it was undisputed that White Sulphur had
not tendered payment during the ninety day period, White
Sulphur asserted that it had been making efforts to close the
deal. The court was unconvinced, again taking a hard line approach: "[W]hen a lessee holding a right of first refusal receives notice of the lessor's desire to sell, he must indicate his
acceptance within the time specified . . . , and must be willing and able to pay for the land at that time."3 0 In the absence of a clear understanding to the contrary, a preemptive
right to purchase can only be effectively exercised by closing
the deal through payment of the purchase price,"' and not by
terms of sale according to the Marston offer.
"Id.
at 40. Unfortunately for White
Sulphur, however, its opportunity to accept terms identical to Marston's offer evaporated when White Sulphur initially began to negotiate different terms. Qualified or
conditional acceptances are counter-offers and operate as a rejection of the original

offer. 1

WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS

§ 77 (3d ed. Jaeger 1957). Had White Sulphur

wanted to exercise its first refusal, it should have immediately given its unqualified
acceptance of the offer and then requested other terms while not insisting on them.
Such acceptances are generally recognized as valid. Id. § 79.
27 Although the court concluded that the variations were material, it would appear that they were rather insignificant as a part of the whole transaction. The contract was for a 560 acre farm at $800 per acre, or $448,000. 605 S.W.2d at 40. The
difference between the Jones-Marston deal and the Jones-White Sulphur deal did
not amount to more than a small fraction of this amount: less than 1%.
28 Since resolution of this issue was unnecessary to the ultimate holding of the
case, it would be presumptuous to say that minor variations between offer and acceptance will no longer be permitted in this context. The prudent practitioner, however, will be sensitive to the problem when assisting clients in exercising a right of
first refusal. Kentucky is not alone in its reluctance to permit the preemptor to vary
the terms of a third party's offer. See, e.g., Coastal Bay Golf Club, Inc. v. Holbein,
231 So. 2d 854 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Hartmann v. Windsor Hotel Co., 68 S.E.2d
34 (W. Va. 1951).
29 605 S.W.2d at 41-42.
20 Id.
(emphasis added) (citing Note, The Right of FirstRefusal Appendant to a
Lease, 53 IOwA L. REV. 1305, 1316 (1968)).
21 The court noted that "White Sulphur's lease stated that White Sulphur would
have the right of first refusal 'to purchase said farm . . . .'" 605 S.W.2d at 42 (emphasis added). Apparently it was the use of the word "purchase" in the first refusal
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entering into an executory contract to purchase at a future
time.
B. Remedies 2
1.

33

Deposits-Retention or Return

Edwards v. Inman3 4 raised the question of when the
buyer may recover his deposit from the seller on a real estate
purchase contract that fails to close. Inman had made a $5,000
deposit on a contract to purchase a farm from Edwards for
$50,000, subject to Inman's obtaining a loan.3 5 The bank, suspecting a shortage in acreage, required that a survey be made,
and a surveyor hired by Edwards found only 188 acres,
twenty-four short of the contract acreage. As a result, the loan
was not made and the deal did not close.38 Inman sued for
return of the $5,000 deposit but was awarded only $3,800; the
remaining $1,200 was awarded to Edwards for incidental ex3 7
penses he had incurred.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the agreement
became void when the condition of obtaining financing failed"8
clause that persuaded the court that the parties contemplated a completed deal.
11 For in depth treatment of the law of remedies in the vendor-purchaser relationship, see 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 11.66-.81 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952 &
Supp. 1977); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 12.7-.15 (1973); M.
FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 12.1-.2(c) (3d ed.
1975).
" See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.5 (1973);
Dunbar, Drafting the Liquidated Damage Clause - When and How, 20 OHIO ST. L.J.
221 (1959) (written by an attorney for practical application); Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495 (1962).
34 566 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
35 Id. at 810. The contract read in pertinent part:
This bid of [sic] contingent upon the purchaser being able to get a loan.
Possession of land will be given after crops are harvested. Two weeks will
be aloud [sic] Loan commitment.
...
If Loan is not approved the down payment will be refunded. As
evidence of good faith binding this contract, a deposite [sic] of $5,000.00 is
made herewith to be applied on purchase price upon pasing [sic] of deed or
refunded should title prove uninsurable or if offer is not accepted.
Id.
26 Id.
37 Id. These expenses included $500.00 for real estate commission, $200.00 for
cost of survey, and $500.00 for attorneys' fees.
" Id. at 811. See generally M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL
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and that Inman was entitled to a full refund. The court then
fashioned a new legal principle by concluding: "In the absence
of an agreement to the contrary, the burden is on the seller to
pay for'39surveys and other incidentals in the sale of real
estate.

Local customs vary widely as to who must pay various
closing costs. 40 In some instances the allocation of closing

costs between buyer and seller may be implied through the
doctrine of custom.

41

In other instances, however, the alloca-

tion is not agreed upon or the closing attorney assigns the
costs according to his own practice. Therefore, awareness of
the Edwards rule could be helpful in a dispute over the allocation of closing costs.
2. Damages
Evergreen Land Co. v. Gatti42 involved a refinement of

the long standing rule 43 that the measure of damages for
breach by the purchaser of real property is the difference between the contract price and the market value" at the time of
PROPERTY § 1.5 (3d ed. 1975). See also Aiken, "Subject to Financing" Clauses in
Interim Contracts for Sale of Realty, 43 MARQ. L. REV. 265 (1959-60) (a comprehensive treatment of the problems arising out of the inartfully drawn "subject to financing" clause).
3 566 S.W.2d at 811.
40 D. SIROTA, ESSENTIALS OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE 270-74 passim (1976); U.S.
DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., REAL ESTATE SErLEMENT COSTS (CCH) 700-1400
passim (1977 rev.).
41
It is well established that a custom which is lawful, and which is permitted to enter into contracts made with reference to it, becomes a part of
the contract, the same as if the custom were incorporated therein, and the
rights of the parties to the contract are to be governed by the provisions of
the custom or usage.
Stuart v. Clements, 216 S.W. 136, 138 (Ky. 1919). See generally 21 AM.JUR.2D Customs and Usages §§ 1-20, 24 (1965); 25 C.J.S. Customs and Usages §§ 1-13, 26
(1966).
42 554 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
43 The rule was first announced in McBrayer v. Cohen, 18 S.W. 123 (Ky. 1892).
44 "Market value" should be regarded as a word of art, not unlike the concept of
the "reasonable man." It has been judicially defined as "the price at which an owner
who desires to sell but is not required to do so would sell the property in its then
condition to a purchaser who desires to purchase but is not compelled to do so."
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Darch, 374 S.W.2d 490, 491-92 (Ky. 1964). See
generally Note, Evidence of Market Value of Real Property in Eminent Domain
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the breach, provided the market value is less than the contract price. In addition, the aggrieved seller may recover the
cost of reselling the property45 and either lost rents or interest,48 whichever is higher.

In Gatti, Evergreen Land Company agreed to sell and
Gatti agreed to buy a 3.01 acre tract of land fronting on a
highly developed commercial strip for $165,000. 4 7 The con-

tract provided: "Seller represents the site is presently zoned
C-1, Commercial.' 48 The title examination revealed that "[i]n
fact, 2.86 acres was zoned C-2, and .15 acre or approximately
5% of the tract was zoned R-4. ' '49 Gatti immediately notified

Evergreen that, because of the zoning discrepancy, he would
not accept title to the property. The property was sold soon
thereafter at public auction for $121,000 as a result of a foreclosure action that had been pending throughout the
negotiations. 50
Evergreen brought suit, claiming damages of $47,000
based on the $44,000 difference between the contract price
and the subsequent sales price, plus court costs of $3,000 incurred during the foreclosure proceedings. The trial court denied relief, holding that Gatti's rescission was justified on the
basis of Evergreen's misrepresentation. The court of appeals
reversed and remanded the case for a determination of the
materiality of the misrepresentation.51
The court of appeals also considered the measure of damages and found the above formula advanced by Evergreen"
Proceedings,49 Ky. L.J. 132 (1960) (discussing the various factors which may be considered by the trier of fact in determining market value).
" McBrayer v. Cohen, 18 S.W. at 124.
46 Graves v. Winer, 351 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Ky. 1961).
47 554

S.W.2d at 863.

48Id.
49

Id.

5OId. at 864.
51Id. at 867.

5,As authority for this calculation, Evergreen relied on Davis v. Lacy, 121 F.
Supp. 246 (E.D. Ky. 1954): "The damages recoverable under the defendants' choice of
remedy are measured by the difference between the purchase price which plaintiff

agreed to pay and the amount received for the property at the second sale, and in
addition 'the cost and expense of the second sale. . . .'" Id. at 252. Evergreen, however, ignored the qualifier immediately preceding the above quotation: "They
readvertised and resold the property. . .. No claim is made that the sale was unfair
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essentially correct but overly simplistic. While resale price
may be evidence of market value, the resale must have been
"made under conditions comparable to the conditions under
which the contract was made, and within a reasonable time
after the breach . . . . ,,The court doubted the relevance of
the amount brought at the foreclosure sale in fixing
damages. 4
The opinion contains a thorough presentation of how to
approach the damages issue, an approach that may be employed with minor variations in most situations where there
has been a breach of an executory contract for the sale of real
property. First, two market values must be established:m (1)
the true value of the property, and (2) the market value of the
property had it actually conformed to the contract specifications." If a material difference between these two values exists, then the party who would suffer because of this difference has a right to rescind and the other party is not entitled
or that the amount realized does not represent its fair market value." Id. The Davis
case, therefore, supported the rule to be adopted in Gatti.
53 554 S.W.2d at 866.
Actually the court would not have been without precedent if it had held as a
matter of law that the foreclosure sale is not sufficiently comparable to be probative
of market value. Levassor v. Central Say. Bank & Trust Co., 60 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Ky.
1933) (judicial notice taken that property does not generally bring as much at forced
sales as at voluntary sales).
5 Market value must be established through competent evidence. This may
come from the owner himself, and non-expert opinion evidence is generally admissible. Commonwealth Dep't of Highways v. Brown, 415 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1967). The
witness must demonstrate, however, at least minimal knowledge of property values in
the area to qualify his opinion as competent. Commonwealth Dep't of Highways v.
Fister, 373 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1963).
While Kentucky courts are liberal in admitting lay opinion as evidence of the
value of real estate, it carries very little weight with the trier of fact. Note, supranote
44, at 138-40. It is always preferable to put on disinterested, well-qualified experts,
especially professional appraisers if they are available. Professional appraisers make
powerful witnesses, and almost invariably obtain verdicts that more than compensate
for their fees. See generally 2 P.O.F. 3 (1959) (qualification of real estate appraiser as
expert witness); 4 P.O.F.2d 590 (1975) (testimony of real estate appraiser). See also
Moskowitz, How to Use Experts Effectively in Land Regulation Proceedings,3 REAL
EsT. L.J. 359 (1975).
11In Gatti, for example, true value would be the market value of the land with
its C-2 and R-4 zoning; conforming value would be its market value if it were actually
zoned C-1.
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to any relief.57 If the difference between these two values is
insignificant, however, the damaged party has a duty to complete the contract, his failure to do so giving rise to a cause of
action.58
What then is to be the plaintiff's award for the loss of his
bargain in the case of a wrongfully rescinded contract? If
there has been a resale, the plaintiff must first prove that it
was made within a reasonable time after the breach, and
under conditions comparable to those under which the contract was made. 9 If he can do so, "the resale price would...
be evidence of actual value, and the difference [between the
resale price and the contract price] would be a proper measure and element of damages."' 0
If the resale price fails to meet the tests of comparability
of time and conditions, then the plaintiff's award must be determined by the contract price-market value differential as
discussed earlier., 1 The Gatti court assumes that the trier of
fact will determine this differential with reference to the conforming value, i.e., the market value of the property as though
it conformed to the contract specifications.
Finally, the defendant is entitled to a setoff as compensation for whatever loss he may have incurred from the "immaterial breach" of the plaintiff.62 Thus, if the damages can be
established by a resale price of the property, the defendant
may deduct from the plaintiff's award any amount by which
the conforming value exceeds the true value.6 3 If the damages
must be established, however, by the difference in the contract price and the conforming value, the defendant would not
be entitled to any setoff since the setoff would have been incorporated in the calculation of the conforming value.4
57

554 S.W.2d at 866.

58 See notes 65-75 infra and accompanying

text for discussion of that part of the
case pertaining to materiality of the misrepresentation.
59 554 S.W.2d at 866.
60Id. Thus, true value would be established as the resale price.
1 See text accompanying note 56 supra.
62 For a discussion of the theory of this setoff, see notes 65-75 infra and accompanying text.
63554 S.W.2d at 866-67.
4 Id. at 876.
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Equitable Remedies

a. Misrepresentation
The court of appeals in Gatti15 remanded the case for a
determination of whether the misrepresentation of property
zoned C-2 and R-4 as C-i was a material misrepresentation. 6
The following instructions were given to the trial court:
[I]f the proof regarding damages indicates little or no difference in value between the contract price and the actual
value of the land due to a zoning variance, then the misrepresentation was immaterial, the rescission constituted a
breach, and [Gatti] should have completed the contract and
sought damages [for any proven diminution in value] rather
than to arbitrarily rescind the contract and become liable to
[Evergreen] for damages."
The trial court was also told to take the view that
[Gatti] is now in the position where he must prove the materiality of the misrepresentation, and if he cannot prove such
a fact by additional convincing evidence, [Gatti] must be responsible for the reasonably forseieable damages caused by
his arbitrary rescission of the contract.6
Gatti is a classic application of the doctrines of material
breach and substantial performance to contracts for the sale
of real property. The court of appeals provided three guidelines for the fact finder as an aid in determining materiality.
First, the misrepresentation is material if the variance would
deprive the purchaser of his intended use for the property. 9
Second, the misrepresentation is material if it is proved to be
the sole reason for the discrepancy in value.70 Finally, the
65 554 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). See notes 42-64 supra and accompanying
text for the facts of this case and a discussion of the damages issue.
"' The trial court stated: "The written contract will stand as is, and the court
will not tamper with its meaning. The contract speaks for itself ....
By not accepting the various contentions of either side, the court will strictly rely on the contract itself." Id.
67 Id. at 866.
Id. at 865.
69 Id. at 864. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§
11-22 (2d ed. 1977).
70

Id. at 866.
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court strongly implied that the "ten per cent rule," allowing
rescission of real estate contracts with acreage errors of ten
percent or more, 1 is applicable to Gatti-type cases where a
qualitative discrepancy exists.72
Whatever standards for "materiality" are applied, one
proposition emerges clearly in Gatti: "The court does not look
lightly at rescission, and rescission will not be permitted for a
slight or inconsequential breach. '7 3 Moreover, the burden of
showing the materiality of the misrepresentation is on the
party seeking to rescind. 4 In a case in which materiality
might be in issue, the party seeking rescission would be well
advised to seek a declaration by the court" of the materiality
of the misrepresentation before refusing to perform further
under the contract.
b.

UnilateralMistake

In Jones v. White Sulphur Springs Farm, Inc.,0 the
court of appeals invoked the long-standing Kentucky formulation of the unilateral mistake rule77 to uphold a contract for
' See note 100 infra for a detailed explanation of this rule.

The court reasoned:
The Appellant argued that since the portion zoned R-4 represented
only 5% of the total area, rescission should not be allowed, because it would
not have been allowed if the spur had not existed. Even though zoning may
relate to quality, whereas size relates to quantity, there is merit in the Appellant's argument.
554 S.W.2d at 865.
72

73 Id.
71 Id. at 865, 867.
75 See Ky. REv. STAT.

[hereinafter cited as KRS] § 418.045 (1972) (authorizing
declaratory judgment actions in contract disputes); Ky. R. Civ. P. 57 [hereinafter
cited as CR].
As a prophylactic measure, the parties may include in their contract a definition
of "material breach" (an unlikely solution), or a mechanism for the resolution of such
disputes. Additionally, an arbitration clause may provide a workable solution. Compare Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp., 559 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1977) and
Warner, The Kentucky Law Survey-Remedies, 67 Ky. L.J. 665 (1978-79) with Prudential Resources Corp. v. Plunkett, 583 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
76605 S.W.2d 38 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionary review denied, 609 S.W.2d 364
(Ky. 1980).
7 The rule first appeared in Annot., 59 A.L.R. 809 (1929) (unilateral mistake as
basis of bill in equity to rescind the contract), and was announced by the court of
appeals by way of dicta in Fields v. Cornett, 70 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Ky. 1934).
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sale of the Jones' farm to Marston. The contract provided, in
pertinent part,
that certain farm . .. containing approximately 450 acres
located on the north side of Highway 460 ... and ... 110

acres more or less located on the south side of Highway 460
[would be sold for $800 per acre].
[T]hen upon payment of the initial payment of One Hundred Thousand Dollars [the Joneses agree to convey a deed
for residence and four acre lot]. 8
A misunderstanding arose whereby the Joneses contended that the $100,000 initial payment was in addition to
the $800 per acre and Marston maintained that the total
purchase price was $800 per acre.7 9 The Joneses sought to re-

scind the contract "on the grounds that there was no meeting
of the minds or mutual assent ... ."80

The court rejected this contention, stating that the written agreement effected a merger of all prior negotiations and
agreements. Furthermore, the court found nothing in the writing to establish that the $100,000 was a separate sum. S The
parties to a writing are bound by its terms except in cases of
fraud, illegality or mutual mistake. Noting that none of these
issues had been raised, the court concluded that this was a
case of unilateral mistake.8 2 To rescind a contract for a unilat78 605 S.W.2d at 40. This contract was made subject to a right of first refusal
held by White Sulphur Springs Farm, an aspect of the case decided adversely to
White Sulphur and discussed in the text accompanying notes 16-31 supra.

78 Id. at 41-42.
'0 Id. at 42.
8' An objective reading of the document suggests that the $100,000 was to be
included in and not in addition to the $800 per acre. But the language is not so clear
as to preclude the interpretation urged by the Joneses. Under these circumstances it
would have been proper to admit extrinsic evidence to show the intent of the parties,
although the law requires that such evidence be clear and convincing. Glass v. Bryant,
194 S.W.2d 390 (Ky. 1946).
82 Since mistake was not being urged by either party, it is somewhat puzzling
that the court decided the case on that basis, for it seems doubtful that either party
was laboring under a mistake. The problem is better characterized as a misunderstanding. See G. PALMER, MISTAKE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 9-13 (1962). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 293 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1975) (mistake defined). A finding of misunderstanding between the parties would require the court to
base its holding on whether there had been a meeting of the minds.
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eral mistake in Kentucky, four conditions must exist: (1) the
consequences of the mistake must be so grave that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable; (2) the mistake
must be material to the contract; (3) the mistaken party must
have exercised ordinary diligence; and (4) the rescission must
be without serious prejudice to either party. 3
The court, in denying rescission, found that the Joneses
had failed to exercise ordinary diligence in handling the transaction. 4 This result illustrates the great potential for injustice
to the mistaken party under the unilateral mistake rule." A
better approach in this case might have been to find the contract ambiguous and thus subject to the introduction of parol
evidence. 8 The court could have then determined if there had
been a meeting of the minds. The Kentucky Supreme Court
would do well to consider abandoning the old rule entirely in
817
favor of one with less potential for injustice.
c.

Mutual Mistake

Whereas relief from unilateral mistake in a contract is
only available in a narrow set of circumstances, a finding of
mutual mistake may be the basis for relief in many situa13

605 S.W.2d at 42-43.

84 "Mrs. Jones testified that she did not read the contract with Marston. The
representative selected by the Joneses to handle the transaction did not inquire
whether the $800 per acre consideration was to be for the entire farm." Id. at 43.
I' Circumstantial evidence indicated that the Joneses had not intended to sell
the farm for only $800 per acre. In addition to the ambiguity of the contract, it is
unlikely that anyone would have sold farmland in that vicinity (Scott and Franklin
Counties) at that price in 1974. Further, unless White Sulphur, a bankrupt, anticipated a windfall it is unlikely that it could have afforded to purchase the farm.
86 It is well settled that parol evidence is admissible to prove the terms of an
ambiguous contract. Caudill v. Citizens Bank, 383 S.W.2d 350 (Ky. 1964); Teague v.
Reid, 340 S.W.2d 235 (Ky. 1960); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1384 (1971).
s1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 295 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1975) contains a good approach to unilateral mistake:
Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made as to a
basic assumption on which he made the contract has a material effect on
the agreed exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the contract is
voidable by that party if he does not bear the risk of the mistake. . . , and
(a) the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable, or
(b) the other party has reason to know of the mistake or his fault
caused the mistake.
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tions.8 Additionally, the three basic remedies for mutual mistake-rescission, s9 reformation ° and restitution 9 1-are considerably more versatile. 2 In appropriate cases the court will
authorize alternative remedies of reformation or rescission,
leaving the final solution up to the parties.9 3
Bush V. Putty94 offers an enlightening contrast between
rescission and reformation when there has been a mutual mistake concerning the subject matter of a transaction. In that
case, Bush agreed to sell "approximately 125 to 130 acres of
land"95 to Putty for $90,000. Aside from this recitation in the
contract there was no discussion between the parties of acreage or of price per acre. In fact, while "both parties were familiar with the farm and its boundaries, neither party knew
the farm's exact acreage." 96
While the contract was executory a survey revealed that
the farm contained 105.99 acres, or at least fifteen percent less
than the contract recital. Putty tendered a reduced sum of
money proportionate to the acreage deficiency and sued for
specific performance at that price.97 Bush asked that Putty
perform the contract at the agreed price, or that the contract
be rescinded. The circuit court found for Putty, stating that
the farm's acreage was material to the contract, and ordering
specific performance at the reduced price.9
88 J. CALAMARI

& J.

PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §

9-26 (2d ed. 1977); 17 Ari.

Contracts § 143 (1964); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 144 (1963).
89E.g., McGeorge v. White, 174 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1943). See generally Annot.,

JUR. 2D

153 A.L.R. 4 (1944).
90 E.g., Wheeler v. Keeton, 262 S.W.2d 465 (Ky. 1953). See generally 66 A,. JuR.
2D Reformation of Instruments §§ 22-23 (1973).
91 E.g., Bradshaw v. Kinnaird, 319 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1958). See generally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 21 (1937).
82 Although rescission and/or restitution will be granted in the limited instances
where relief is available for a unilateralmistake, the court will not invoke a reformation remedy except where the mistake is mutual. See Fields v. Cornett, 70 S.W.2d
954, 957 (Ky. 1934); Annot., 59 A.L.R. 809 (1929).
93 E.g., Harrison v. Talbot, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) 258 (1834). See generally Annot., 1
A.L.R.2d 9, 106 (1948).
o, 566 S.W.2d 819 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
9- 566 S.W.2d at 820 (quoting from a recital in the contract signed by the
parties).
98 Id. at 821.
97 Id.
at 820.
18 Id. at 821-22. Harrison v. Talbot, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) 258 (1834), is the leading
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Although the court of appeals agreed that the farm's
acreage was material, it rejected the circuit court's remedy
and ordered rescission of the contract. It reasoned that since
there had been a serious mistake, no contract had ever been
made and that, therefore, enforcement would be unconscionable.99 The court rejected the specific performance remedy 00
stating only "that the remedy is not appropriate for the facts
in this case." 1'01 It appears that because specific performance
with abatement in price would have led to an unconscionable
result, the court chose rescission as the preferable remedy - a
safe decision, but questionable in light of prior Kentucky
case authority in this country for determining whether to grant equitable relief to an
aggrieved party for a mutual mistake in acreage when land is sold by the gross.
The Court established four classifications for sales of land in gross. The first two
include sales made without reference to acreage, or sales whose circumstances indicate that the parties intended to risk the contingency of quantity. The Court concluded that modification of contracts falling in either of these categories should not
be available. The third category encompasses sales in which the parties evidence an
intent to use no more than the usual rates of excess or deficit in similar cases; the
fourth encompasses sales which, though deemed sales in gross, are in fact understood
to be sales by the acre. In sales falling in either of the last two categories, an unreasonable surplus or deficit may entitle the injured party to equitable relief.
The Harrisoncourt ruled that the case fell in the third category and denied specific performance of the contract, which resulted in relief to the injured party, Harrison. The Court did not, however, fashion any specific remedy for the controversy.
Therefore, Harrisonshould be cited for its four-class formulation to determine when
relief may be available, but not for the specific remedy applicable. Accord, Wallace v.
Cummins, 334 S.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Ky. 1960). For a comprehensive analysis of the
rule of Harrisonv. Talbot, see Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 9, 67-73 (1948).
A corollary to Harrison v. Talbot is the 10% rule. Once it is determined that
acreage was material, even though the sale was in gross, the variance from the acreage
recited in the agreement must also be material. Harrisondescribed a material variance as simply "an unreasonable surplus or deficit." 32 Ky. (2 Dana) at 267.
The first case to actually mention a 10% rule was Boggs v. Bush, 122 S.W. 220
(Ky. 1909), in which the Court stated:
While the courts have not set a rule applicable to all cases, in Kentucky no
case to which our attention has been called has granted the relief where the
deficit was less than 10 per cent., and none where it was refused where the
deficit was as much as or more than 10 per cent.
Id. at 222. After Boggs, the Court automatically applied the 10% rule, and, in Chilton
v. Head, 237 S.W. 422 (Ky. 1922), it was permanently established. The 10% rule has
been adopted in no other state than Kentucky. See generally Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 9,
100-05 (1948).
9 566 S.W.2d at 822-23.
100 Id. at 822.
101 Id.
at 821.
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cases.
The difficulty could have been avoided and the case decided on sound precedent if the court had made an independent evaluation of the evidence. 102 Examination of Putty's position would have revealed that Putty had no real concern for
acreage; 10 3 and therefore, Bush should have been granted specific performance of the contract at the agreed price. 10 4
C.

Installment Land Contracts

In the significant case of Sebastian v. Floyd,103 the Supreme Court of Kentucky joined a growing number of states' 0
in holding that a seller may not enforce a provision in an installment land sale contract'0 7 that provides for forfeiture of
102 Since the case was tried entirely by deposition, the court was not constrained
by the "clearly erroneous" standard of CR 52.01. It was in as good a position as the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. See Huffman v. Russell Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 390 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1965).
103 The evidence revealed that Putty had rented the farm from Bush, from 1971
until January, 1976, and that Putty was engaged in a farming operation on the property. Obviously, he knew and considered the farm's capacity for production of income
when contracting with Bush for a gross sale at $90,000. An acreage deficiency would
have no effect on the farm's value to Putty. This, combined with the absence of any
discussion of acreage by the parties, plainly reveals that the sale was made in gross
without concern for the acreage.
104 See 71 AM.JUR.2D Specific Performance § 115 (1973); 81 C.J.S. Specific
Performance § 77c (1977).

:5 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979).

100E.g., Honey v. Henry's Franchise Leasing Corp., 415 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1966);
Freedman v. Rector of St. Mathias Parish, 230 P.2d 629 (Cal. 1951); H & L Land Co.
v. Warner, 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Skendzel v. Marshall, 301
N.E.2d 641 (Ind. 1973); Nigh v. Hickman, 538 S.W.2d 936 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
Only the Kentucky and Indiana Courts have indulged in judicial legislation on
the matter, and even Indiana has carved out exceptions to its new rule. See Strausbaugh, Exorcising the Forfeiture Clause from Real Estate Conditional Sales Contracts, 4 REAL EST. L.J. 71 (1975).

State legislatures have been active, however, in regulating the extent to which
forfeiture clauses in land contracts may be enforced. Oklahoma has outlawed the enforcement of all forfeiture clauses in land contracts, dictating that they are to be
treated in all respects as mortgages. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 11A (Supp. 1979). Maryland distinguishes the sale of residential property sold to a noncorporate purchaser
from the sale of all other property. On the former, judicial sale is the exclusive remedy; on the latter, there are no statutory regulations. MD,. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§
10-101 to -108 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1980); MD. R.P. W79.
107 For additional information concerning the legal problems associated with
land contracts see G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
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all payments upon the purchaser's default. In a brief and lucid opinion the Court reasoned, "[t]here is no practical distinction between the land sale contract and a purchase money
mortgage ... ."108 Stating that both are financing devices
whereby the seller retains a lien on the property as security
for part or all of the purchase price, the Court concluded that
there should be no distinction in their enforcement. Since
purchase money mortgages are enforced through judicial
sales 09 with the mortgagee recovering only the amount owed
plus costs,110 and the mortgagor retaining any balance,' land
11 2
contracts should be enforced in the same manner.
The Court stated that a rule treating the seller's interest
in a land contract as a lien best protects the interests of both
buyer and seller. The remedy of a judicial sale allows the
seller fulfillment of his expectations in the deal while still protecting the purchaser's equity in the property."13
§§ 3.25-.32 (1979); Hines, Forfeitureof Installment Land Contracts, 12

KAN. L. REV.
475 (1964); Nelson & Whitman, The Installment Land Contract-A National Viewpoint, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 541.
108 585 S.W.2d at 383.
' KRS § 426.525 (Cum. Supp. 1980) forbids foreclosure of a mortgage. This
proscription refers to the practice of "strict foreclosure," requiring no judicial sale,
used in a minority of jurisdictions. If the mortgagor does not pay off the debt within a
specified period of time following his default, title to the property vests in the mortgagee without a sale. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WmTMAN, supra note 107 at §§
7.9-.10. Except for its limited right of redemption, strict foreclosure operates in much
the same way as enforcement of land contracts prior to Sebastian.
The term "foreclosure" is therefore a misnomer in Kentucky, and when used it
refers to the institution of a suit to enforce a lien against property as provided in
KRS §§ 426.005-.006 (1972). Insurance Co. of N. America v. Cheathem, 299 S.W. 545,
546 (Ky. 1927).
110 585 S.W.2d at 383.
Since July 15, 1980, attorneys' fees, to the extent they are actually incurred, may
also be recovered from the mortgagor, if the written instrument provides for them.
KRS § 453.250 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
"1 585 S.W.2d at 383. See KRS § 426.685(2) (1972).
'12 See Gamble v. Bryant, 599 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionary review
denied, 599 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1980), where the court stated that the seller's recovery
on a land contract must be measured by the amount owed on the contract, plus interest accrued under the contract and any expenses incurred because of the purchaser's
default. The court reversed a lower court judgment awarding the seller fair rental
value of the property.
113 585 S.W.2d at 383. The only commercially available practice guide for Kentucky attorneys engaged in enforcement of mortgage liens is 3 J. RICHARDSON, KENTUCKY PRACTICE §§ 421-460 (2d ed. 1968). See generally G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D.
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Sebastian will no doubt be unpopular among those who
find that enforcement of land contracts now requires more
time and money than before. It should serve, however, to prevent the abuses of land contracts which have resulted from
forfeiture of the purchaser's equity. The decision also provides
sellers an advantage they did not have under the old system
of enforcement, that of a personal judgment against the defaulting purchaser should there be a deficiency in proceeds of
4
the sale.1
D.

Realty Limited with a Contingent Future Interest

When real property is limited with a future interest in
persons unborn or whose identity is not presently ascertainable, a problem arises in conveying good title." 5 In Blackaby v.
Barnes,116 certain property was willed to Anna Barnes for life
with the remainder to her children. Anna and her only living
children, Darlene Studle and Karen Kay Barnes, and
Darlene's husband, Ronald, joined in an agreement to convey
the land to the Blackabys. 1 7 The Barnes family petitioned
the circuit court for approval of the sale, but the court denied
approval, stating: "[W]here a contingent interest in unborn
children exists, real estate may not be conveyed by private
118
sale."
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that in the absence
of express authority from the legislature, a private sale of contingent interests in realty is not permissible."' The decision
supra note 107 at §8 7.11-.18; 55 AM.JUR.2D Mortgages §§ 1361-1387
(1971); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §§ 604-812 (1949).
I" KRS § 426.005(1) (1972) provides: "In an action to enforce a mortgage or lien,
judgment may be rendered for the sale of the property and for the recovery of the
debt against the defendant personally." Additionally, the seller has the following statutory rights: attorneys' fees, KRS § 453.250 (Cum. Supp. 1980); recoupment of expenses incurred in preserving or maintaining property abandoned by the mortgagor,
KRS § 426.525 (Cum. Supp. 1980); and unlimited interest rates on principal sums of
more than $15,000, KRS § 360.010(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
15 See generally 51 AM.Juit.2D Life Tenants and Remaindermen §§ 81-83
(1970); 31 C.J.S. Estates §§ 88c-89 (1964).
'Is 587 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
WHITMAN,

:17

Is

Id. at 853.
Id.

I's Id. at 854.
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required the court to consider the arguably conflicting provisions of Kentucky Revised Statutes [KRS] section 389.040,120
which it construed in favor of established precedent. 121 Since
the Blackaby decision, KRS section 389.040 has been repealed1 22 and replaced by KRS section 389A.035.12' This new
provision expressly requires a public commissioner's sale authorized by order of the circuit court in all instances where an
interest in the land "may be possessed by persons unborn or
not immediately ascertainable ....,,12' Therefore, a private
sale authorized by the court would still be improper under
KRS section 389A.035 as it was in Blackaby. Fiduciaries and
real estate practitioners should be aware that sales of land
made in violation of this statutory provision could result in
title problems.
120

KRS § 389.040(1) (1972) had long been construed to require a judicial sale,

while KRS § 389.040(2) (1972) appeared to authorize a private sale approved by the
court.
121 Trimble v. Trimble, 262 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1953); Vittitow v. Keene, 95 S.W.2d
1083 (Ky. 1936). Both cases had held that a judicial sale was required to transfer real
property limited with a contingent future interest.
122 Ch. 87, § 10, 1980 Ky. Acts 168.
123 Ch.87, § 7, 1980 Ky. Acts 167. This act created an entire new chapter, KRS
ch. 389A (fiducial and judicial sales of real estate), which includes procedures for sale
or division of realty in which two or more persons share title, but an interest therein
may be possessed by persons unborn or not immediately ascertainable. KRS §
389A.035 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Requirements are set out for investment or distribution
of the proceeds from the sale.
All laws which previously governed fiducial and judicial sales of real property, i.e.
KRS §§ 386.090, 389.010-.060 (1972), were repealed. Ch. 87, § 10, 1980 Ky. Acts 168.
Unfortunately, various sections of KRS ch. 389 (sales of realty of persons under
disability) were amended in three subsequent acts of the 1980 session. Ch. 160, 1980
Ky. Acts 412; ch. 188, § 284, 1980 Ky. Acts 585; ch. 396 §§ 111-115, 1980 Ky. Acts
1245. All amendments but one constitute mere technical changes in terminology to
conform to other parts of KRS. The import of the one substantive amendment is also
embodied in the new KRS ch. 389A. Nevertheless, these largely technical amendments, being later in time, had the effect of reenacting most of KRS ch. 389.
These various legislative enactments appeared to provide alternative sections
with regard to sales of real property belonging to certain classes of persons under
disability. Obviously, it was not the intent of the legislature to enact parallel provisions and KRS ch. 389A should be used for all applicable fiducial and judicial sales.
See KRS § 446.130 (1975). This problem should be corrected by the 1982 general
assembly.
124 KRS § 389A.035 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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PRIVATE LAW DEVICES FOR LAND USE CONTROL125

Historically, restrictions on the use of real property were
not viewed with judicial favor. 2 ' These restrictions interfered
with the rights of property owners and, therefore, were strictly
construed against the party seeking to enforce them. 2 7 Over

the past three decades, however, the Kentucky courts have
shifted from a rule of strict construction to one of strict enforcement. The modern view is that restrictive covenants are
to be regarded more as a protection to the property owner and
the public than as an undesirable restraint on the use of the
property. 12 Reasonable restrictions placed on the use of prop-

erty in unambiguous language will be strictly enforced, but a
restrictive meaning will not be read into ambiguous language.'29 The following cases are illustrative of the current judicial attitude in Kentucky.
A.

Residential Subdivisions

In Highbaugh Enterprises, Inc. v. Deatrick and James
Construction Co.,'3 the court of appeals again refuted the
concept that restrictive covenants should be strictly construed
against the party seeking their enforcement. Defendants were
homeowners in a subdivision with deed restrictions requiring
that plans for various improvements be submitted to the de12 Two noted authorities have recently published excellent articles on the sub-

ject of restrictive covenants, equitable servitudes and reciprocal negative easements:
Kratovil, Building Restrictions-Contractsor Servitudes, 11 J. Mar. J. Prac. & Proc.
465 (1978); Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An Analytical Primer, 52 WASH. L. REV.
861 (1977).
126 See Meyer v. Stein, 145 S.W.2d 105 (Ky. 1940).
127 E.g., Parrish v. Newbury, 279 S.W.2d 229, 233 (Ky. 1955); Norris v. Williams,
54 A.2d 331, 332-33 (Md. 1947).
128 See, e.g., Hayes v. Marshall, 501 S.W.2d 269 (Ky. 1973); McFarland v. Hanley, 258 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1953); Highbaugh Enterprises, Inc. v. Deatrick & James Constr. Co., 554 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionary review denied, (Ky. 1977). But
see North Cherokee Village Memb. v. Murphy, 248 N.W.2d 629, 630 (Mich. Ct. App.
1977) (covenants to be strictly construed against those claiming enforcement right
and any doubt to be resolved in favor of property's free use); Boiling Springs Lakes
Div. v. Coastal Services Corp., 218 S.E.2d 476 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (adherence to the
rule of strict construction).
'29 Hayes v. Marshall, 501 S.W.2d 269, 272 (Ky. 1973).
130 554 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionaryreview denied, (Ky. 1977).
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veloper for his approval.1 3 1 Defendants, who sought to build a
concrete parking pad on the front part of their lot, submitted
a landscaping plan to the developer who rejected it. Refusing
to alter their plans, defendants proceeded with construction of
the pad and the developer sought an injunction in the circuit
court. 132

The circuit court denied the injunction, but the court of
appeals reversed, reasoning that a parking pad is so "integrally connected" with the landscaping on the lot that it fell
within the provision requiring the developer's prior approval
for all landscaping.3 3 Although the restrictions were silent on
parking facilities, the court was willing to recognize them as
landscaping so as to assist the developer in carrying out his
13 4
general scheme for the subdivision.
Adams v. Marshalll'5 involved the interpretation of a restrictive covenant requiring the exterior of all residences to be
of masonry construction. Holding that "canyon stone"136 qualified as masonry in conformance with the covenant, the Supreme Court rejected the argument "that 'canyon stone' did
not exist as a product in 1956 when the deed restriction was
executed, and that by masonry construction the parties meant
construction of brick or natural stone.' 137 If the restriction
contemplates only products in existence at the time of its creation, the Court reasoned, it must contain language to that
,3 554 S.W.2d at 879.
,32Id. The lower court was unwilling to go beyond the literal wording of the
covenants, which were silent on parking facilities.
,3 Id. at 880.
'3 Although no Kentucky case has yet enunciated the distinction, it appears that
the courts are eager to enforce a servitude consistent with a developer's general
scheme, but more reluctant to enforce a servitude whereit tends to hinder a general
scheme of development. Compare First Sec. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Peter, 456
S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1970) (upholding a reciprocal negative easement) with Bellemeade
Co. v. Priddle, 503 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. 1973) (refusing to recognize a reciprocal negative
easement); compare Franklin v. Moats, 273 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1954) (upholding a restriction as to residential use despite an assertion of changed conditions) with Stortz
v. Siebenaler, 490 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1973) (invalidating a restriction as to residential
use because of changed conditions).
554 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1977).
," ,'[Clanyon stone' is a product made of cement and a blend of aggregates cast
under high pressure in molds resulting in a rough, stone-like appearance." Id. at 359.
137 Id.
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effect. 135 Adams confirms indications in previous cases that
the Court will not interpret covenants retrospectively, but will
instead construe restrictive covenants according to their
meaning at the time of the controversy.' 39
Chapman v. Bradshaw4" addressed the problem of various restrictive covenants pertaining to construction in a subdivision, but which did not expressly prohibit mobile homes.
The Court concluded that mobile homes were prohibited,
stating that the use of the word "constructed" in the restriction "refers, in ordinary parlance, to a building permanently
attached to the realty. . .. " The Court continued: "Clearly, a
'house trailer' violates the requirement that 'any building...
that is constructed upon this land shall have a solid

foundation.' ,,141
B.

Commercial Developments
1.

Cases Arising Under Common Law

With only rare exceptions, 4 2 the law makes no distinction
between covenants on commercial property and covenants on
residential property. The consequences, however, of covenants
on commercial property may be more significant because of
the magnitude of many commercial undertakings. Humana,
Inc. v. Metts 43 is illustrative. Metts acquired a ninety-five
138

Id. at 360.

"' Marshall v. Adams, 447 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1969); Pulliam v. Wiggins, 580 S.W.2d
228 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), discretionary review denied, 585 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. 1979);
Humana, Inc. v. Metts, 571 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionary review denied,
585 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1978). This construction is a significant departure from earlier
cases in which the Court sought to ascertain the intent of the parties in light of surrounding circumstances at the time the restriction was created. See Ashland-Boyd
County Health Dep't v. Riggs, 252 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Ky. 1952). Kentucky's construction is not generally accepted by the other courts. See Boiling Springs Lakes Div. v.
Coastal Services Corp., 218 S.E.2d 476, 478 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); 20 Am.JuR.2D Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 186 (1965).
140 536 S.W.2d 447 (Ky. 1976).
"I Id. at 448.
14 The law provides for more stringent treatment of covenants in restraint of
trade. Pulliam v. Wiggins, 580 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), discretionary
review denied, 585 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. 1979).
1,3571 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionaryreview denied, 585 S.W.2d 400
(Ky. 1978).
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acre commercial tract and immediately sold twenty acres to
Humana. The deed from Metts to Humana restricted the
property to professional office use, hospital and extended care
nursing home facilities. Humana constructed a hospital and
medical center on the premises. The medical center contained
two optical dispensaries, a pharmacy and a doctors' exercise
club., 4 No other deeds from Metts to subsequent purchasers
145
contained any restrictions.
Metts and the subsequent purchasers brought an action
against Humana to enjoin operation of the optical dispensaries, pharmacy and exercise club. Two principal issues were
resolved on appeal. First, the court held that the purchasers
whose deeds contained no mention of restrictions had standing to enforce the covenants in the Metts-Humana deed.146 In
arriving at this decision the court inquired into whether the
covenant was designed to protect only Metts or to protect the
remaining property. The court found that the purpose of the
covenant was to protect the remaining property; thus, it "runs
with the land" and would be enforceable by any successor in
1 47

interest.

Second, and more important, the court held that the optical dispensaries, pharmacy and doctors' health club were prohibited by the restriction of the property to "professional of144
145
146

Id. at 623.
Id. at 626.
At first blush, this appears to be a moot issue. Since Metts was a plaintiff, he

could enforce the covenants and his vendees did not require standing. A careful reading of the case, however, suggests that Metts may have been an involuntary plaintiff.
It is possible that Metts was willing to release Humana on the covenants. See id. at
624-25.
The sales agreement between Metts and Humana set out the restricted use to be
made of the land, and these restrictions were repeated in the deed. The agreement
also contained the following sentence not in the deed: "No other use shall be made of
the subject property without the express written consent of Metts." Id. at 624. The
implication was that Metts could unilaterally lift the restrictions, notwithstanding the
objections of Metts' subsequent purchasers. The court properly applied the doctrine
of merger to reject this argument: "The terms, conditions, provisions and restrictions
of the contract for the purchase were merged into the deed of conveyance. Any conflict between the two must be construed in favor of the latter. There is no authority
given in the deed for anyone to grant relief from the restrictions." Id. at 625.
,17Id. at 625-26. See Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 556 (1973) (who may enforce restrictive covenant).
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fice use. "148 The court reasoned: "It is not for the Court to
ascertain what the parties meant to say. It is for the Court149
to
determine what the parties meant by what they did say.

Although in keeping with the court's recent decisions that
covenants will be strictly enforced according to their terms, 150
the holding is surprising because the ordinary meaning of
"professional office use" today includes pharmacies and similar facilities as "ancillary medical services."' 5' Moreover, the
decision violates the principle that covenants made in restraint of commerce should be given the least restrictive interpretation.' 52 Thus, the doctors' club should have been excluded, but the other facilities should have been allowed to
remain. The lesson of Metts is that the courts will not supply
provisions that the parties may have intended but inadvertently omitted.
Pulliam v. Wiggins15 3 presents an interesting comparison

to Metts. Whereas Metts involved a servitude on one small
tract for the benefit of the larger whole, Pulliam involved a
servitude on the entire area for the benefit of one small tract.
Wiggins and others purchased land for development as a
shopping center, and subsequently conveyed one lot to Pulliam through a ground lease.15 4 Pulliam drafted the lease,
which contained a provision that Pulliam was to build a drivein restaurant and that neither the lessors, nor their heirs, assigns or nominees were to lease, assign or sell any other prop148 571 S.W.2d at 627.

Id. at 626. Accord, Marshall v. Adams, 447 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Ky. 1969).
150 E.g., Hayes v. Marshall, 501 S.W.2d 269 (Ky. 1973).

"" 571 S.W.2d at 627 (Wilhoit, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Indeed, the recognition of ancillary services in a professional office building is so pervasive than many zoning ordinances which contain a "professional office" designation
expressly allow them as "accessory uses." See, e.g., LEXINGTON-FAYETrE URBAN
COUNTY, Ky., ZONING ORDINANCE RESOLUTION sch. sheet 2 of 5 (1975). But see North
Cherokee Village Memb. v. Murphy, 248 N.W.2d 629, 630 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (rejecting references to analogous statutory provisions for the purpose of interpreting
restrictive covenants).
5I Although the court recognized the principle in one paragraph of its opinion, it
seemed unable to stray from the narrow meaning for the covenant in question. 571
S.W.2d at 626.
-5- 580 S.W.2d 228 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), discretionaryreview denied, 585 S.W.2d
409 (Ky. 1979).
114Id.

at 229.
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erty owned by them in that area for a similar type business.
The lessors reserved the right to one "McDonald type restaurant" to be located anywhere on the property, and to other
restaurants with inside service in the shopping center
proper.1 55
After Pulliam had built his restaurant, Wiggins deeded
Pulliam's lot in fee to Wylie, who later sold it to Pulliam.
Each conveyance was made subject to the foregoing provision.
Wiggins then announced that he intended to build a free
standing Bonanza Steak House, and Pulliam sued to enjoin
156
Wiggins.
Since Pulliam had acquired the fee to his own leasehold,
Wiggins maintained that the lease (with its restrictions) had
157
merged into the greater estate and had been extinguished.
The court recognized the rule of merger, 58 but refused to apply it to defeat the covenant which Pulliam clearly intended
159
to be preserved throughout the transactions.
Next, the court, in determining the meaning of "shopping
center proper," vigorously applied the principle of narrow
construction of agreements in restraint of trade. 60 Moreover,
it properly observed "that a contract must be construed more
strongly against the party who prepared it."'' Thus the court
found the shopping center proper to be any part of "the developed area, reachable by motor vehicle . . . by established
roads and parking areas," and Wiggins was allowed to build
'5' Id.

1 Id. at 229-30.
16 Id. at 230.
118 Id. (citing Larmon v. Larmon, 191 S.W. 110, 112 (Ky. 1917)). The doctrine of
merger has its roots in the Rule in Shelley's Case and, as it relates to Pulliam,means
that when the same person comes into ownership of a leasehold estate and the underlying remainder in fee simple at the same time, the leasehold is merged into the fee
simple, destroying all incidents of the leasehold including the restrictive covenants.
"I The court stated: "[T]here can be no merger when it is contrary to the intention of the parties." 580 S.W.2d at 230. Accord, 28 AM.JUR.2D Estates § 328 (1966); 31
C.J.S. Estates § 124, at 226-27 (1964). See also KRS § 381.110 (1972) (abolishing the
destructibility rule).
160 580 S.W.2d at 231. Cf. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Sheehy Properties, Inc.,
266 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1978) (narrow construction of restrictive covenant which
would prohibit lessor from letting any property for restaurant similar to one operated
by lessee).
161 580 S.W.2d at 231.
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the Bonanza Steak House." 2 Although there were several indications that Pulliam intended the term "shopping center
proper" to embrace only the main building of a conventional
strip shopping center or mall, 63 it is also interesting to note
that the construction of the provision urged by Pulliam would
have allowed restrictions against restaurants which were not
considered as competition in the first place. 64
Pulliam confirms two principles which have guided courts
in arriving at decisions relating to covenants. First, while professing to examine conditions that existed when the covenant
was created, courts will examine the meaning of the covenant
in light of conditions as they existed at the time of the controversy.' Second, courts will look more favorably upon a covenant that, in benefitting a large area, places a burden on a
relatively small area, rather than one which has the opposite
effect.'
Id.
The restriction permitted the lessor (Wiggins) "to have other restaurants...
located in the shopping center proper." Id. at 231, 239 (emphasis added). A construction consistent with that imposed by the court would have permitted Wiggins to
build other restaurants located on the shopping center proper.
16 Under Pulliam's construction of the covenant, restaurants without drive-in
service would have been prohibited, while the language of the covenant could easily
be interpreted to exclude only fast food restaurants with drive-in service. As the court
points out, "[t]he restriction involved herein is one designed to either eliminate drivein competition or limit other types of food establishments in the same shopping complex." Id. at 231. The court simply opted for the least restrictive interpretation.
106 Cf. Adams v. Marshall, 554 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1977) (holding that canyon stone
complies with covenant requiring masonry construction, when canyon stone was unknown at the time of the covenant's creation).
The covenant in Pulliam was originally made in 1967 when the fast food industry
was in its infancy. 580 S.W.2d at 229. Free standing fast food stores were seen infrequently, unlike the present pattern where restaurants, branch banks and auto service
stores, etc., occupy the road frontage with a shopping mall set further back behind
these units. It was much easier in 1978 to conceive of the "shopping center proper" as
including highway frontage than it would have been in 1967.
In addition, the court noted that appellant's "testimony is quite uncertain as to
what the developers of the center represented to him could comprise the future shopping center, and if he was unsure of the situation [at the time the covenant was created], we certainly cannot provide the facts necessary to sustain his position." Id. at
231.
...Cf. Humana, Inc. v. Metts, 571 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionaryreview denied, 585 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1978) (the burdened property was the smaller part
of the whole).
162

163
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2. Leasehold Covenants and Kentucky's Consumer
Protection Act
A case of first impression in Kentucky, Mendell v.
Golden-Farley of Hopkinsville, Inc.81 7 questioned the statutory legality of covenants contained in a shopping center lease
which restrict competition. Golden-Farley leased space for a
men's store in a shopping mall. In an addendum to the lease,
the mall owners agreed not to rent additional space for the
purpose of selling "medium to better" men's or boys' clothing.8 8 Six years into the ten year lease, the mall let space to
another company for a men's store which competed directly
with Golden-Farley. As a result of this action Golden-Farley
sought and obtained a restraining order against the mall own18 9
ers in circuit court.
The only serious defense raised was that the restriction in
the lease should not be enforced because it violated KRS section 367.175, a part of the Consumer Protection Act. 170 Observing that the wording of this statute parallels sections one
and two of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,1 7 ' the court turned to
federal decisions for guidance. The United States Supreme
Court has construed the Sherman Act as prohibiting "those
classes of contracts or acts which the common law had
deemed to be undue restraints of trade and those which new
2
times and economic conditions would make unreasonable.'1
167 573 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. Ct. App.), remanded for issuance of mandate, 573
S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1978).
1"8 Id. at 347-48. Not affected by this restriction were five large anchor tenants

(J. C. Penney Co., Walgreen Drug Co., Montgomery Ward, F. W. Woolworth Co., and
Malone & Hyde Supermarket) to whom space had already been leased.
169 Id. at 348.
170 KRS §§ 367.110-.300 (Cum. Supp. 1980). KRS § 367.175 provides:
(1) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in this Commonwealth shall
be unlawful.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce in this
Commonwealth.
KRS § 367.175 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
171 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
172 573 S.W.2d at 349 (quoting from KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959)).
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Applying these standards, the court concluded that the enactment of KRS section 367.175 did not materially change Kentucky common law with respect to the validity of restrictive
covenants in leases and thus the restriction was upheld. 7 3
Mendell indicates that Kentucky courts will continue to
examine the validity of restrictive covenants in restraint of
trade by applying common law principles. 174 Therefore, it
would appear
that anti-trust theories must be pursued in fed75
1
eral court.

III.

COMMON LAW DEDICATION

In Herron v. Boggs, 7 6 a developer filed a subdivision plat,

with a portion designated "PARK." The plat was shown to all
purchasers and all lots were sold by reference to it. After selling all the lots, the developer constructed a residence in the
park. Three years later, the lot owners filed 77suit asking for
1
injunctive relief for removal of the residence.
The Kentucky Supreme Court granted the lot owners the
requested relief, stating: "When [the developer] recorded the
plat and sold lots in accordance with the plat, this constituted
a dedication of the streets and the PARK to the public and
thereby divested [him] of legal title to the area.' 178 The plat
became incorporated by reference as a part of the deeds to the
individual lots; thus, the park became an appurtenance to
17 9
each lot.

Herron is consistent with a long line of Kentucky cases,"8
some of which have implied that the mere filing of a plat conS.W.2d at 349.
174See generally Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 4 (1964); see also Annot., 1 A.L.R.4th 942
(1980).
175The extent to which the federal courts will tolerate shopping center lease restrictions in restraint of trade is still an unsettled question. See generally Harold
Friedman, Inc. v. Thorofare Markets, Inc., 587 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1978); Note, The
Antitrust Implications of Restrictive Covenants in Shopping Center Leases, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1201 (1973).
M 582 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1979).
177Id. at 643-44.
178 Id. at 644.
1279Id. (quoting Cassell v. Reeves, 265 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Ky. 1954)).
180See, e.g., South Covington & C. St. Ry. v. Newport, L. & A. Turnpike Co., 62
S.W. 687 (Ky. 1901).
173573
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stituted an irrevocable dedication of the streets and open areas.""" In Herron, however, the owner sold lots with reference
to the plat, thereby creating an expectation in the purchasers.
Therefore, it is impossible to determine whether Herron represents a retreat from earlier cases whereby both filing of a
plat and reliance thereon would be required before courts
182
would find a dedication.

In Kemper v. Cooke,183 a street was platted and filed in a
rural subdivision plat in 1968. It was opened as a passage
through the subdivision in 1970. In 1976, owners of property
abutting the street barricaded one of its outlets, rendering it
useless except to subdivision residents.8 ' A member of a
church which was located near the barricade, but outside the
subdivision, sought an injunction to remove the obstruction,
alleging injury because the closing of the street required him
5
18
to take a longer route to his church.

The court of appeals denied the church member relief because the street in question had never been accepted by the
fiscal court as part of the county road system. Therefore, the
court concluded, it could not be kept open for use by the general public, and further, the county was not required to accept
responsibility for the street's maintenance.8 8
As the developer had clearly dedicated the street for public purposes, it no longer belonged to any individual. It had
not, however, attained the status of required public maintenance. Neither did it have to be maintained for the public by
the abutting owners. Therefore, they were free to maintain
the road in any way they mutually saw fit, including barricad181 E.g., Fayette County v. Morton, 138 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1940); Martin v. Hampton Grocery Co., 76 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1934). This is clearly a minority position. See 3
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.134, at 476 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
182This distinction would be relevant in situations where a developer desires to
alter his plans after filing a plat but before selling any lots.
183 576 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
181 Id. at 265.
18 Id. at 264-65. The suit was originally brought on behalf of the church by its
trustees, but these parties withdrew early in the case. There is dictum implying the
outcome may have been different had the church as a whole stayed in the case and
proved damage to its property because of the barricade. Id. at 266.
186 Id. at 265.
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ing one end. e7 Kemper indicates that, in the absence of any
statute to the contrary, the general public has no right to enjoyment
of a passageway not maintained by a governmental
18 8
unit.
IV.

EASEMENTS APPURTENANT

Easements may arise in a variety of ways.18 9 During the

survey period, however, there were significant cases involving
only two of the methods whereby easements are created: estoppel and implied grant or reservation.
A.

Easements by Estoppel

An easement by estoppel may be described as a license
which has become irrevocable because of expenditures made
by the licensee, coupled with acquiescence of the licensor.'9e
These conditions were present in Holbrook v. Taylor 91
wherein Taylor used an old haul road running across the hilly
woodlands of Holbrook's property to move materials and
equipment to Taylor's lot. With Holbrook's permission, Taylor widened the road, put in a culvert and graveled it. Taylor
continued to use the road for five years without objection
from Holbrook. 9 2
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that Taylor's license
Id. at 265-66.
leg The court's reasoning is sound and its conclusion generally correct except
167

that the street had been open from 1970 to 1976, a period of more than five years.
KRS § 178.025(1) (Cur. Supp. 1980) provides: "Any road, street, highway or parcel
of ground dedicated and laid off as a public way and used without restrictions by the
general public for five (5) consecutive years, shall conclusively be presumed to be a
public road." The holding, therefore, could not have been based on the right of abutting property owners to barricade the street. The case was correctly decided on its
facts because the court also concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain
the action.
189 Easements may arise by grant, reservation or exception, covenant, agreement,
dedication, prescription, implied grant or reservation, or estoppel. 2 G. THOMPSON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 330 (J. Grimes 1980 repL).
290 See Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Ky. 1976); Bob's Ready to
Wear, Inc. v. Weaver, 569 S.W.2d 715, 720 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); 2 AmRicAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 8.116 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
191 532 S.W.2d 763 (Ky. 1976).
192 Id.
at 766.
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had achieved the status of an easement by estoppel. The
Court stated that where a party acquires a license to use the
property of another, and with the knowledge and acquiescence
of the licensor makes expenditures connected with its use,
then "the license becomes irrevocable and continues for so
' 93
long a time as its nature calls for."'
In Bob's Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Weaver, 9" the court applied easement by estoppel to grant access to the back door of
a store building across an adjacent parking lot.19 Bob's, however, developed the principle that an easement by estoppel is
not an easement of unlimited duration. The owner of the
dominant estate is entitled to rely on the easement's continued existence only for as long as the servient estate can practically support the intended use granted by the license. Although the owners of the parking lot were estopped to revoke
the store's license of access to the back door, the owners were
not forever required to use their property as a parking lot to
support the easement. The court stated: "If the.., property
should cease to be used as a parking lot open to members of
the public, then the [store's] license should also cease."' 96
B. Easements by Implication
1. Implied Reservation of Easement
"The term 'easement by implication' includes both easements of necessity and so-called quasi-easements.' 197 In Carr

v. Barnett,98 Barnett conveyed five acres of a fifteen acre
tract of land to Carr. The remaining ten acres were landlocked, as all the road frontage was conveyed with the five
acres. Because there was no reservation of an easement in the
193

Id. at 765.

1- 569 S.W.2d 715 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

191Id. at 720. For additional facts of this case, see text accompanying notes 204205 infra.
'I"Id. at 721. Of course, the servient owner's cessation of the property's present
use is subject to the usual requirement of good faith. Id.
197 Id. at 718 n.1. See generally Note, Implied Easements of Necessity Contrasted with Those Based on Quasi-Easements,40 Ky. L.J. 324 (1952); Note, Reservation of Easements by Implication, 22 Ky. L.J. 313 (1934).
580 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
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deed, the court held that there had been an implied reservation of an easement across Carr's land. 199
An easement may be implied in favor of the grantor or
the grantee. When the grantee seeks an easement across his
grantor's land, it is only required that the easement be "reasonably necessary."200 But when the grantor seeks an implied
reservation of an easement, the standard is that the easement
be "strictly necessary." 0 1 Since Barnett, as the grantor, had
no means of access other than across Carr's land, he met the
higher "strictly necessary" standard that applied to him.
2. Implied Grant of Easement
In Bob's Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Weaver,"2 it was the
grantee who sought an easement by implication. Bob's store
and Weaver's restaurant were located in adjacent downtown
buildings sharing a common wall. Until 1971, the two buildings and a parking lot behind them all shared common
outside ownership. In 1971, the store and restaurant owners
each bought the building occupied by them. Bob's store made
substantial improvements to the back of its building, putting
in a new rear entrance from the parking lot and new display
windows. In 1976, Weaver purchased the parking lot and
closed off the rear entrance to Bob's store by erecting a chain
link fence on the common boundary. 03
The court of appeals affirmed a lower court ruling that
Bob's store was not entitled to an easement by implication
across the parking lot.20 4 Of several factors listed by the court

for determining whether the parties have intended to create
an easement, 205 all were favorable to Bob's store except that of
199 Id. at 240.

Bob's Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Weaver, 569 S.W.2d at 719.
Carr v. Barnett, 580 S.W.2d at 240.
202 569 S.W.2d 715 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
203Id. at 717-18.
204 Id. at 720.
205
Among the factors bearing upon the intention of the grantor and
grantee are the following: (1) whether the claimant is the grantor or the
grantee of the dominant tract; (2) the extent of necessity of the easement to
the claimant; (3) whether reciprocal benefits accrue to both the grantor and
grantee; (4) the manner in which the land was used prior to conveyance;

200
210
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whether reciprocal benefits accrue to both the grantor and
grantee. The court recognized that any benefits accruing to
Weaver would cease if he wanted to make any other use of the
parking lot. This factor, combined with the absence of any absolute necessity for the easement caused the court to "conclude that the trial judge did not err in refusing to adjudge
[Bob's store] an easement by implication."20 8
C. Intensification of the Easement's Use
Smith v. Combs20 7 examined the rights of the parties

when the dominant estate is transformed from a single tract
into a subdivision. This intensified use of the easement imposes a much greater burden on the servient estate. The court
of appeals surveyed prior case law20 8 and formulated a three

part test for use in determining whether the additional burden is unreasonable in any given case.
First, under the test, extending a roadway easement to
land not a part of the original dominant tract constitutes an
unreasonable burden.20 9 Second, whether the intensified use of
the original dominant tract constitutes an unreasonable burden is a question of fact, unless, third, the intensified use was
contemplated by the parties when the easement was created,
in which case it cannot be held unreasonable.21 0
D. Interference with Use of the Easement
211
1. Obstructing the Passway
Stewart v. Compton,212 one of the most useful property
and (5) whether the prior use was or might have been known to the parties
to the present litigation.

Id. at 719.
206 Id. at 720.
2.7

554 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

208 Delph v. Daly, 444 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1969); McBrayer v. Davis, 307 S.W.2d 14

(Ky. 1957). See generally Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 960 (1966) (right of owners of parcels
into which dominant tenement is or will be divided to use right of way).
209554 S.W.2d at 413-14.
210

Id. at 414.

21 See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 9 (1973) (right to maintain gate or fence

across right of way).
222 549 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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cases decided during the survey period, involved the passway
to a cemetery across part of a farm. The servient owner took
title to the farm with knowledge of the easement, and with an
express reservation in the deed for the passway. When the
owner placed a locked gate across the passway, the dominant
owners sought an injunction to have the lock removed.213
The court of appeals held that since the passway was reserved as an open or free passway for use without hindrance,
the lock created an unreasonable burden on the easement. Requiring the owners of the easement to use keys was an unreasonable burden, especially when there was no discernible reason for locking the gate.21 ' The court further held that the

easement owners were entitled to a reasonable amount of
space in which to turn their vehicles around.215
2. Relocating the Passway
Not only did the servient owner lock the gate in Stewart,
he also bulldozed the existing passway and moved its location. 216 In upholding his right to do so, the court stated:

"[T]he owner of a servient estate may change the location of a
free passway easement so long as [he] does not change the beginning and ending thereof and it does not result in a material
inconvenience to the rights of those entitled to use the
[easement]. 217
Stewart contains a useful principle the application of
which can result in increasing the value of burdened property
to its owners. 218 Because the only limitation on moving pass-

ways to more convenient locations is that the relocation not
be unreasonable or burdensome, servient owners will be able,
Id. at 832-33.
There was no dispute over the owner's right to maintain a gate, but only his
right to keep it locked. Id. See generally Herndon v. McKinley, 586 S.W.2d 294 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1979).
215 549 S.W.2d at 833.
216Id. at 832.
217 Id. at 833.
216 See M. FRIEDMAN, CoNTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 4.9(m)
(3d ed. 1975).
218
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in many cases, to ameliorate the effects of a burdensome ease-

ment by relocating it.21

219 Of course, the principle is not applicable when the location of the easement is
specified in the instrument creating it. Newberry v. Hardin, 161 S.W.2d 369 (Ky.
1942).

